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Abstract
Nutrients are a major source of water quality impairment. This paper compares efficient use of nutrients
in a wholly owned animal-crop production system versus an integrator-operator animal-crop production
system and highlights the operator’s tradeoff between prevention and utilization of excreted nutrients
under conditions of uncertainty. Results derived from the comparison of different production systems are
used to infer the consequences of implementation of nutrient land application restrictions, a key element
in the recently drafted United States Department of Agriculture and United States Environmental
Protection Agency Unified Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations.
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Introduction:
Nutrients are a major source of water quality impairment. Recently, political attention has focused on
large confined animal feeding operations as a major source of nutrients, primarily the nutrients found in
animal waste. To reduce nutrient loading from confined livestock and poultry farms the United States
Department of Agriculture and United States Environmental Protection Agency drafted the Unified
Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations. Although still in the review process, the “Unified Strategy”
could require confined animal feeding operators to account for generated nutrients from their operation
and limits the amount of land-applied nutrients to “optimal” agronomic rates. In several livestock regions
of the United States, animal nutrients are generated by animal feeding operations in excess of those
needed to land apply at optimal agronomic rates. If these excess nutrients are not properly managed, they
may enter surface or ground water and degrade water quality.
In this paper, we compare the profit maximizing decisions of a wholly owned animal-crop
production system versus an integrator-operator system in which an integrator supplies feed and animals
and the operator has sole responsibility for the excreted waste. It is assumed that the contracting
arrangement between the integrator and the operator does not incorporate the waste management costs
into the contract.
1 The relevance of this analysis stems from the growing concern over the increased
concentration of the livestock industry and the hog industry in particular (Martinez 1999). If, for a given
operation, total cropland does not change and with increased concentration more animals are raised, then
less land will be available for land application thus tipping the nutrient balance toward “excess” nutrient
application. The Unified Strategy would limit this excessive application.
                                                
1 Other USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) researchers are also investigating animal waste management
issues.  Aillery et al. develops a regional model to assess waste management options for the Chesapeake Bay
Watershed. Huang, Magleby and Somwaru analyze the impact of the Unified Strategy on hog farmers in the
Heartland who maximize net returns from crop production.  The analysis in this paper differs from the Huang,
Magleby and Somwaru by focusing on the tradeoff between prevention and utilization, as well as highlighting the
role of joint production, contracting and nutrient uncertainty in the decision making process.  The examination of the
integrator-operator (contracting) system in this paper also complements ERS research that focuses on the role
contracting plays in hog farm productivity (Key and McBride).2
This paper focuses on the tradeoff between preventing nutrients from entering the production
stream versus utilizing the nutrients once they have reached the end of the animal production component
as a means by which the operator can reduce the waste management cost. The operator’s available options
are grouped into two categories: prevention and utilization. Reductions of nutrients in animal waste can
be prevented by altering feed rations or by instituting a phased feeding routine, which matches the
nutrient content of the feed to the nutrient requirement for a given age and weight of the animal. In the
analysis that follows, only feed ration alterations are considered. Utilization measures involve relocating
excess nutrients off the operator-owned land in such a way that they will not degrade water quality
elsewhere.
Once off the feeding operation the animal waste containing the excess nutrients may be applied to
cropland, composted, pelletized for use as a fertilizer or converted to bio-fuel. Again, we limit the
available options to only land application and assume that the operator leases the land thus avoiding the
complications that arise when trading animal waste between operators. These simplifying assumptions do
not alter the qualitative result and allow the analysis to clearly focus on the issue of trading off prevention
and utilization measures to satisfy the regulator’s land application constraint (the regulator’s problem will
be described below). Past research has examined the economic costs and benefits of altering feed rations
(Bosch, Zhu and Kornegay 1996, Bosch, Zhu and Kornegay 1997; Honeyman 1993; Boland, Foster and
Preckel 1999; Boland, Preckel and Foster 1998; Parker 2001). As discussed below, we enhance the fed
ration allocation problem by incorporating uncertainty about the nutrient content of the feed ration. Chen
(1973) first examined the role of nutrient uncertainty in optimal feed rationing.
Figure 1 depicts the animal-crop production stream. The nutrients are introduced into the
production stream through the feed rations. If the animals are grown under contract, then it is assumed
that the integrator, the supplier of feed and animals to the operator, does not bear the waste management
cost, a downstream pecuniary externality, that results from excess nutrients in the animal waste. The
operator bears the cost and the only option available in this integrated system is for the operator to apply
the nutrients over additional acreage. Under a contracting regime, the downstream recipient of the waste,3
the operator, may choose to enter an agreement where by the liability of the nutrient in the stream are
jointly held by the integrator and the operator thereby internalizing the externality. In actuality, co-
permitting has been discussed as a provision of the Unified Strategy. We will see in the theoretical and
empirical sections of this paper that the unencumbered integrator mixes feed rations in such a way that








Figure 1. Flow of Nutrients through Integrated Animal-Crop Production System
The operator’s problem is complicated by the fact that the nutrients contained in the feed rations
or in the animal waste are not known with full certainty. As noted in Chen (1973), relying on the expected
quantity of the nutrients in the feed ration will fall short fifty percent of the time. We assume that the
integrator or operator in the wholly owned system wishes to meet the nutrient requirements of the animal
more often than fifty percent of the time. Chen’s analyzes on protein content presents data on different
feed ingredients with the standard deviation that vary from 1.28 to 0.20. From the data used in the
empirical analysis of this paper we see that the standard deviations for phosphorus and nitrogen
                                                
2 Sunding and Zilberman (1998) conclude that a life-cycle approach to product liability may increase efficiency over
single assignment liability.  However, their research suggests that no liability may result in a more efficient use of
the polluting input.  Walls and Palmer (2001) also provide a life-cycle assessment of externalities and waste
production.  These authors examine social optimal policies primarily taxes, which in a sense is a method for4
concentrations in manure vary from 0.868 and 1.755 respectively and correspond to expected values of
2.087 and 3.852 pounds per ton of manure.
Because the operator faces uncertainty associated with the nutrient content of the feed ration and
the animal waste, probabilistic constraints on the objective function are imposed such that the operator
meets the nutrient requirements of the animal and the crop being planted with a margin of safety. The
concept of a margin of safety allows the operator, in principle, to minimize the probability that the
realized quantity of nutrients in the feed ration or the animal waste is less than the necessary quantity for
optimal animal or plant growth. Van Kooten, Young and Krautkraemer (1997), apply a similar approach
to the problem of dynamic cropping decisions. This model allows us to investigate the role of uncertainty
associated with the nutrient requirements for “optimal” animal and plant growth when deciding between
prevention and utilization options.
The imposition of a land application restriction further complicates the operator’s decision
making process. The regulator in this analysis seeks to minimize the “over-application” of nutrients so
that water quality improvements can be realized. The regulator understands that there is uncertainty in the
nutrients that are land applied and so applies a margin of safety approach to restricting land applications.
The operator, under this type of regulatory regime, shall not exceed an upper limit on nutrient application
within an arbitrary set frequency. In other words, the probability that the nutrient application exceeds the
upper limit of the assimilative capacity of the crop and land characteristics shall be arbitrarily small.
The theoretical and empirical work on nutrient use, whether it is nutrient content of feed rations
or fertilizer use in crop production, has provided explanations for why observed levels of nutrient use
differ from recommended levels. Risk preferences and uncertainty are commonly used as explanations for
the observed “over-application.” In the analysis that follows it is shown that joint production systems can
also result in greater levels of nutrient use in feed rations. The same cannot be said for crop production.
For crop production to result in greater nutrient use the producer must face a self-imposed minimum
                                                                                                                                                            
spreading liability.  This will depend on the market structure since the incidence of the tax will depend on the
structure.5
nutrient constraint on land application. It is also shown that uncertainty, via a probabilistic constraint on
nutrient content, produces the “apparent” excess levels of nutrients. In the analysis the operator is
assumed to be risk neutral and thus the findings from this paper avoid explaining away the excessive
application of nutrients as a result of risk aversion.
The previous research on livestock feeding operations has been extensive. Unfortunately, few
have focused on a systems approach as applied in this analysis (see Roka and Hoag 1996; Hoag and Roka
1995; and Schnitkey and Miranda 1993, for exceptions). We explore a more rigorous treatment, however,
incorporating probabilistic constraints where the uncertainty about the nutrient content is applied to both
feeding rations and crop production. Also, we incorporate a probabilistic constraint as a regulator choice,
which follows from the work of Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988) on controlling environmental risks.
3
In the analysis, profit-maximizing operators of animal-crop production systems are evaluated.
While exploring the decision making process of these operators certain assumptions are made to simplify
the presentation and focus attention on the economic tradeoffs between prevention and utilization. These
assumptions include fixing the number of animals and thus the capital expenditures on buildings and
waste storage, raised by the operation. This assumption
renders this analysis as a short run examination and, although in the long run decisions on the number of
animals and capital expenditures are crucial to understanding the evolution of the livestock industry in
response to the Strategy, the tradeoff between prevention and utilization is primarily a short run problem.
Second, we assume the cultivated crop is fixed. Crop production is not typically limited to a single crop
and some crops may be more desirable from the stand point that they uptake a greater quantity of
nutrients. Nonetheless, in most instances there are only a few dominant crop options.
In the empirical analysis, we test the implications of the theoretical model, where we examine the
role production systems and land holdings play in efficient nutrient use and the imposition of downstream
                                                
3 The theoretical work posited by Lichtenberg and Zilberman originated with the work of Charnes and Cooper who
developed chance constraint optimization and Kataoka’s work on stochastic programming.  For empirical
applications of this margin of safety approach see Lichtenberg, Zilberman and Bogen, and Harper and Zilberman for6
externalities. In addition, the cost to hog operators from complying with the Unified Strategy given the
inability of the operator to satisfy a desired level of safety in meeting nutrient requirements of the animals
and crops grown is evaluated. The data used in the empirical analysis comes from a national survey
conducted for the 1998 USDA Hogs Production Practices and Costs and Returns Report under the 1998
USDA Agricultural Resource Management Study Phase III.
In the following section the theoretical model is presented. Three separate scenarios are depicted,
highlighting the importance of uncertainty in the operator’s decision to adopt prevention measures versus
utilization measures for handling nutrients in the production stream. Section 3 details the empirical
analysis, including a brief description of the data, the empirical models and results. Section 4 concludes.
Theoretical Model:
Three models are presented that highlight the efficient use of nutrients in an animal-crop
production system. In these models it is assumed that the operator considers the nutrients contained in the
manure as a viable alternative to chemical fertilizers. First, the case of nutrient certainty is presented. It
can be shown from this first model that an operator who simply raises hogs will use fewer nutrients in the
feed ration than an operation with joint animal and crop production. This hog-only operation serves as a
proxy for the integrator-operator system, where it is assumed that the integrator hires the operator to feed
and house the hogs and all animal waste decisions are the sole responsibility of the operator. In other
words, this integrator-operator system does not internalize the costs or benefits from the nutrients
introduced into the production stream via the feeding rations. In the second model uncertainty is
introduced by imposing two probabilistic constraints on the profit maximizing objective function. Here
we see how the uncertainty associated with feed rations and manure nutrient content affect the manager’s
allocation decisions. With this second model we can infer that uncertainty about the nutrient content will
result in greater nutrient use in the feeding ration and greater overall levels of fertilizer use to supplement
                                                                                                                                                            
environmental risk to farm labor and Litchtenberg and Penn as it relates to water quality impairment from poultry
operations.7
the available manure. Finally, in the third model we introduce the land application constraint. This
constraint also embodies uncertainty by imposing a probabilistic limit on nutrient application. Although,
the hog operations are used to describe the animal production component in these models and the only
nutrient considered is phosphorus, the model can easily be adapted to other animal species and nutrients.
In all the models a risk neutral agent maximizes profits from both animal production and crop
production by selecting phytase (r) and rock phosphorus (r) to supplement the hog feed ration at the
animal production operation, and fertilizer application (f ) and leasing land (L) as part of the crop
production operation. There are other variables that the operator could select including the number of
animals, the manure storage technology, the crop to cultivate and many others. However, ignoring these
latter choices will not alter the qualitative result we wish to highlight, namely the difference between a
wholly owned system and an integrator-operator system, and the tradeoff between preventative measures
to reduce nutrients in the production stream versus utilizing the nutrients once they have entered the
stream.
Even with this simplified model there are still many components that must be made explicit. First,
the feed ration consists of a fixed quantity of ingredients that comprise the basic nutrient needs of the
animal. However, not all the phosphorus in this ration is available when consumed by the swine. Let us
denote the phosphorus in the ration as r . If phytase is added the swine can absorb a greater portion of
this phosphorus. Alternatively, rock phosphorus can be added which is more readily available for the
swine than r . Note, if rock phosphorus is used as a supplement, then each animal will excrete a greater
quantity of the phosphorus because not all the rock phosphorus is utilized either. Let the total quantity of
phosphorus consumed be denoted as  r r + . Mathematically, we represent the retained phosphorus per
animal with the following expression
0 , 0 , 0 ) 0 ( ], )[ ( < > „ + = rr r f f f r f y r r (1)8
where f, is a concave function that determines the portion of phosphorus that the animal retains after
consuming the supplemented feed ration. It follows then that the excreted phosphorus is
] )][ ( 1 [ r r + - r f (2)
The final specification for the animal production component is the swine growth function
0 , 0 ), ( < > yy y y h h h . (3)
Now, without elaborating on the storage system we will assume a fixed proportion of the excreted
phosphorus is lost through spillage or runoff due to rainfall events, which will be denoted as  ) 1 , 0 ( ˛ h m .
The phosphorus that remains we will define as available phosphorus from manure (m), which on a per
acre basis is
] /[ ] )][ ( 1 [ o h L L r r x m m + + - = r f (4)
where x is the herd size, and L
o is the operator’s acreage holding. The crop production decision also
includes a choice of applying phosphorus fertilizer in addition to manure such that the per acre applied
phosphorus is  f m ap + = . The final specification is the crop growth function,
0 , 0 ), ( < > apap ap Y Y ap Y . (5)
The objective function for the unconstrained certainty scenario is9
L c L L c f c ap Y p x c r c h p Max L o a f y r h
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y are the net prices for hogs and the cultivated crop, respectively, c
r and c
r are the per
pound cost of rock phosphorus and phytase, respectively, c
f is the per ton cost of phosphorus fertilizer, c
a
is the per acre application cost, which is assumed to be identical for applying manure and fertilizer, and c
L
is the cost to lease an acre of land.
4
The first order conditions are
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Equations (7) through (10) define the optimal levels of phytase, rock phosphorus, fertilizer and land under
conditions of full certainty about nutrient contents of the feed ration and the manure. As usual, the levels
are chosen so that the marginal cost and marginal benefit for each decision variable are equivalent. From
equation (7) we see that phytase use may be higher when production is decoupled given that the marginal
cost of phytase use in crop production  0 ] ][ [ < + o
ap
y L L ap Y p r  is not realized in the decoupled
production scenario. This implies that phytase use may be lower in a wholly owned joint production
system. Another interpretation is that the value of manure generated via a phytase feed is lower than when
rock phosphorus is used. From equation (8) we see that rock phosphorus use will be greater in a wholly10
owned animal-crop production system given the crop production benefits attributed to additional
phosphorus in the manure,  0 ] ][ [ > + o
r ap
y L L ap Y p . This result can explain why some analysts have
inferred that operators use “excess quantities of nutrients.” Finally, the expansion of this farm beyond the
initial land holding (L
o) is discouraged by the loss of nutrient value when the manure is spread over a
greater quantity of land,  0 ] ][ [ < + o
L ap
y L L ap Y p .
The above derivation provides a benchmark for which the model now departs to incorporate
producer uncertainty. First, the available phosphorus in the feed ration is uncertain. The producer will
supplement the feed rations with nutrients such that the probability that the available nutrients are less
than the nutrient requirement is less than a specified safety margin (a). If the phosphorus requirement of
the animal is r* then we can construct the following probability constraint
a y - £ £ 1 *] [ r P (11)
If we assume the available phosphorus in the feed (y ) is normally distributed then we can rewrite this
constraint as
* ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( r F ‡ - - y s a y m (12)
where  ) (￿ F  represents the cumulative normal distribution,  ) (y m  is the expected value and  ) (y s  is the
standard deviation. In addition the operator does not want the cultivated crops to receive nutrients below
some threshold level (r
L). This second margin of safety constraint is written as
b - £ £ 1 ] [ L r ap P (13)
                                                                                                                                                            
4 The cost of leased land could be made to be an increasing function of the quantity of land to reflect the increased
cost of finding additional acreage and transporting the manure to this land but the qualitative results do not change11
where b is the margin of safety. Again, if we assume the applied phosphorus (ap) is normally distributed
then we can rewrite this constraint as
L r ap F ap ‡ - - ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( s b m (14)
The first order conditions for the producer-imposed margin of safety model are (12),(13) and
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From equation (15) we see that the imposition of safety margins further reduces the incentive to use
phytase and increases the incentives to use rock phosphorus. The fertilizer use is now greater than in the
unconstrained model and again we can see why hog operators and crop producers have an incentive to use
greater quantities of phosphorus. This result confers with the theoretical findings in Babcock (1992),
where uncertainty is used to explain why farmers may use “excessive” or “inefficient” quantities of
fertilizer. The imposition of safety margins also reduces the incentive for leasing land.
Now the regulator steps in and imposes a regulatory constraint. The regulator sets an upper limit
(r
H) on phosphorus application per acre based on the nutrient uptake of the cultivated crop. The crop
                                                                                                                                                            
and thus we maintain the linear specification.12
producer cannot exceed this upper limit except under “special” circumstances. To account for all
possibilities the regulator requires that the probability that the applied phosphorus exceeds the upper limit
is less than a predetermined safety margin. We write this constraint as
g £ ‡ ] [ H r ap P (19)
where g is the safety margin. Again, assuming that ap is distributed normally we can rewrite this
constraint as
H r ap F ap £ + ) ( ) ( ) ( s g m (20)
Finally, in this last model we see the tradeoff between the Unified Strategy requirement limiting land
application of phosphorus and the producer’s margins of safety to insure the animals and cultivated crops
receive phosphorus at levels to insure proper economic and physical growth.
The first order conditions are now (12),(13), (20) and
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From equation (21) the operator’s incentive to use phytase is increased due to the reduced cost of
satisfying the regulator’s constraint  0 ] ) ( [ 3 > + - y s b m l ap F ap ap . From equation (22) the opposite
can be said for rock phosphorus where the regulator’s constraint imposes a higher marginal cost from
using rock phosphorus,  0 ] ) ( [ 3 < + - r ap ap ap F s b m l . Equation (23) and (24) show similar incentives
for reducing fertilizer use and increasing cultivated acreage. The imposition of the regulator’s constraint
on land application therefore has wide reaching implications for trading off prevention measures,
increasing the use of phytase, and utilization measures, increasing cultivated acreage. In the next section,
an empirical analysis provides statistical evidence to support the hypotheses implicit in the first model.
These results are then used to infer the implications for animal-crop production system as it pertains to
prevention and utilization solutions to satisfying the regulator’s constraint.
Empirical Analysis:
Data from the 1998 Agricultural Resource Management Study Phase III are used in the empirical
analysis. The data set consists of 1633 observations spanning 22 hog producing states. Table 1 provides
definitions for the variable names. Table 2 lists the observations by state, the average inventory of animal
units and the percentage of the systems in each state that operate under an integrator-operator
arrangement. The number of animal units (AUs) raised on an average system varies considerably from
4,788.4 AUs in Utah to 81.2 AUs in Wisconsin. The average acreage per AU also varies across states
with 42.19 acres per AU in South Dakota to 1.48 acres per AU in North Carolina. The variation in the
percentage of the systems that are integrator-operator is perhaps the most striking with Arkansas and
North Carolina having 85 percent of the systems as integrator-operator systems and Tennessee having
only one percent of the surveyed systems as integrator-operator systems. Table 3 contains additional
summary statistics for several key parameters for both the wholly owned production systems and the14
integrator-operator systems. The integrator-operator systems have lower average values for all the
parameters of interest. These means are statistically different at the 0.001 significance level.
Table 1. Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition
AU Animal Unit=1,000 lbs. of liveweight
IO =1, if integrator-operator system
=0, if wholly owned system
Ac/AU Acres per animal unit
P/ton Pounds of phosphorus per ton of manure
N/ton Pounds of nitrogen per ton of manure
Ac/Pton Total operation acres per pounds of phosphorus per ton
Ac/Nton Total operation acres per pounds of nitrogen per ton
Table 2. Observations, Average AUs, Average Acres/AU, and Percent IO, by State
State Observations AUs Acres/AU %IO
Alabama 65 157.1 6.86 15
Arkansas 61 436.5 1.94 85
Colorado 29 123.0 34.93 7
Georgia 71 162.7 8.38 4
Illinois 136 329.0 9.92 9
Indiana 83 357.0 5.54 10
Iowa 88 286.5 6.28 23
Kansas 54 253.1 20.97 6
Kentucky 42 200.6 9.60 5
Michigan 59 420.8 11.82 17
Minnesota 97 292.3 8.94 27
Missouri 82 302.6 8.38 5
Nebraska 64 304.4 13.31 6
North Carolina 206 1000.1 1.48 85
Ohio 116 204.1 8.06 19
Oklahoma 63 646.8 18.87 57
South Carolina 59 329.6 16.73 39
South Dakota 65 219.5 42.19 6
Tennessee 75 123.5 11.13 1
Utah 13 4788.4 8.67 39
Virginia 49 966.2 10.53 22
Wisconsin 56 81.2 16.54 4
Total 1633 44.8 12.78 2715
Table 3. Expected Value for Key Parameters
System Observations Variable Mean Median








The analysis that follows examines the differences between wholly owned animal-crop
production systems and integrator-operator systems and compares the nutrient concentrations in the
generated manure, the animal units raised, and the acreage used in the production system. Inferences
drawn from these comparisons are used to examine how the Unified Strategy will affect the different
systems as well as the tradeoff between prevention and utilization. In the near future, a simulation model
will be calibrated using this data to evaluate the cost of complying with the Unified Strategy for varying
scenarios based on producer and regulator margins of safety. This latter exercise will provide a range of
outcomes that allows us to better understand the impact that the Unified Strategy may have on livestock
operations and ultimately on water quality conditions.
First, the theoretical result that an integrator-operator production system uses a lower quantity of
rock phosphorus in the feed ration and thus generates lower phosphorus concentration in the manure is
examined. The negative correlation between P/ton and IO and the difference of means test, which showed
that P/ton for the integrator-operator systems was statistically lower at the 0.001 significance level,
support the theoretical finding that integrator-operator systems will have less nutrient concentrations in
the generated manure. Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients derived in the empirical analysis (all of
the correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.001 significance level). The same
relationship exists between the nitrogen concentration and the IO variable. However, this difference in
nutrient concentration may be attributable to the manure handling system employed in the waste
management component (not specified in the theoretical model). Lagoon handling systems reduce the16
total phosphorus content by nearly 60 percent whereas a pit system retains approximately 95 percent of
the total phosphorus (Moore). Furthermore, a review of the relationship between production system, and
between lagoon versus pit systems shows that 80 percent of IO systems operate lagoon systems while
only 46 percent of wholly owned operations operate lagoon systems. The correlation between contracting
and lagoon systems is 0.43 and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level of significance.
The second test involves drawing a relationship between the acreage per animal by production
system. The correlation and difference of means tests between acreage per animal and IO, which are both
statistically significant at the 0.001 level, shows that the integrator-operator systems have significantly
less land per animal unit. This suggests that the integrator-operator systems may not have sufficient land
holding to spread the lower nutrient concentrated manure. Given lower nutrient concentrations in the
generated manure, a nutrient restriction per acre may have a greater impact on the integrator-operator
systems if the integrator-operator system has less land per animal unit and the lower acreage dominates
the lower nutrient concentrated manure.
The final test compares the acreage per pound of phosphorus per ton of manure. This test allows
us to see if the integrator-operator systems face a greater burden associated with managing “excess”
manure nutrients. The correlation coefficient between acreage per pound of phosphorus per ton of manure
and IO was negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The difference of means test was also
statistically significant at the 0.001 level and showed that the acreage per pound of phosphorus per ton of
manure was lower for integrator-operator systems than for the wholly owned systems.
Table 4. Correlation Coefficients for Key Parameters
Ac/AU P/ton N/ton IO
Ac/AU 1 0.10465 0.10628 -0.18816
P/ton 0.10465 1 0.9808 -0.23865
N/ton 0.10628 0.9808 1 -0.26807
IO -0.18816 -0.23865 -0.26807 1
The following inferences are drawn from the above results and pertain to the potential
implementation of the Unified Strategy and the implications for the different systems and the tradeoff17
between prevention and utilization of nutrients in the production stream. First, the integrator-operator
systems are likely to face greater costs associated with complying with the Unified Strategy because they
must locate greater additional acres of land to spread manure than the wholly owned systems. Second, the
distribution of integrator-operator systems across the states listed in Table 2 suggests hog production will
be more adversely effected is some states than in others. In particular, Arkansas and North Carolina far
exceed all other states in the share of integrator-operator systems and thus could face greater costs
associated with the proper management of manure.
Now turning to the impact of the Unified Strategy on the prevention versus utilization tradeoff.
First, it is expected that the relative cost between prevention and utilization will influence the optimal
mix. If the Strategy increases the land acreage needed to spread the “excess” manure then the cost of
acquiring addition land will most likely increase. This increase in land costs may encourage an increase in
the use of feed supplements that increase the retention of nutrients by the animals and thus a lower
concentration of manure nutrients. Also, given that it appears that the Unified Strategy would adversely
effect the integrator-operator systems more than the wholly owned systems, the operators may place a
greater emphasis on prevention measures in the contractual arrangements between integrators and
operators. Of course, if co-permitting or joint liability is incorporated into the Unified Strategy, then we
may see a concerted effort on both the integrator and the operator to arrange for adopting preventive
measures over land application.
Concluding Remarks:
This paper examines the tradeoff between prevention and utilization of nutrients in the animal-
crop production stream and the differences in the decision making process between wholly owned
production systems and integrator-operator systems. The analysis shows that under wholly owned
production conditions some of the apparent excess nutrients in the manure is the result of an optimal
decision. Some excess application of nutrients during the crop production component can be explained by
the margin of safety used by the operator to insure that the cultivated crop receives a minimum quantity of18
nutrients. Also, the economic value of nutrients is illustrated when a joint production system is explicitly
modeled. In addition, in the empirical analysis it is shown that the operator in an integrator-operator
system faces greater challenges under the recently proposed Unified Strategy for Animal Feeding
Operations
Several issues were raised above that were conveniently assumed away. In particular, the issues
of co-permitting and contracting were not fully explored. In the future, these issues will provide greater
insight into designing regulatory schemes to control excess application of nutrients and thus improve
water quality. It may also be the case that requiring co-permitting or joint liability may result in
decreasing the percentage of operations that contract with integrators. We may see in the future a
movement toward further consolidation and less contracting given the costs involved in developing “fair”
contracts that allow the downstream externality recipient to share the cost of the externality with the
upstream producer (the integrator and its nutrient rich feed).
Overall, this analysis allows us to see that the problem of controlling nutrient runoff from
confined animal feeding operations requires a systems approach. Further, it is possible that the regulator
can better serve environmental concerns by providing information that reduces the uncertainty about
nutrient content thus reducing the “excess” use of nutrients. Also, efforts could focus on reducing the cost
of utilizing the nutrients once they have entered the production stream. Reducing the cost of utilization
may take the shape of increasing the economic value of the nutrients by supporting value-added
technologies such as composting, bio fuel generation, or conversion of manure to pelletized fertilizer.
Absent a regulatory requirement, incentives may be needed to encourage farmers to voluntarily reduce the
nutrients entering or exiting the production stream. This may require time, as farmers learn about
alternative technologies or crops to cultivate that serve to decrease the cost of meeting water quality
goals.19
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